Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Robert B. Hansen, Attorney General v. Utah State
Retirement Board, Et al. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
ROBERT B. HANSEN, WILLIAM GIBBS, BERNARD M. TANNER; Attorneys for
Appellant;WILLIAM T. EVANS, ROBERT MOORE, MERLIN LYBBERT, FRANK V. NELSON,
MARK A. MADSEN; Attorneys for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board, No. 16851 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2089

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE- STATE OF UTAH

-----------------------------------------

ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

Case No.

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
et al.,

16851
16714
16560

Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Decision of the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
The Honorable Christine M. Durham, and
The Honorable Horner F. Wilkinson

-----------------------------------------ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General

WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
25 So. Wolcott
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

WILLIAM GIBBS
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

ROBERT MOORE
Attorney at Law
10 Broadway Bldg., No. 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MERLIN LYBBERT
Attorney at Law
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UTah 84101
FRANK V. NELSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
MARK A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

F ~LED
APR 10 1980
'it....-••., .............. - ....... ..,_,... --~···~ ··- .. - _, - ____ ..,.,. ....«'c.-.::_J

·Clor~ Supreme Court, Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
At±:..arnevs for Resoondents
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney Genera 1,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vUTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
et al.,

Case Nos. 16851, 16714, and
16560

Defendants-Respondents.)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE CHRISTINE M. DURHAM AND THE HONORABLE HOMER F.
WILKINSON
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
25 South Wolcott
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112
ROBERT MOORE
Attorney at Law
10 Broadway Bldg., No. 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MERLIN LYBBERT
Attorney at Law
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM GIBBS
BERNARD M. TANNER
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellant

FRANK V. NELSON.
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
MARK A. MADSEN
Assistant Attorney General
540 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Sponsored by the
Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Attorneys
forS.J. Respondents'
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE -------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ------------------------

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL--------------------------------

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------

4

ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------POINT I

8

UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ADOPTED
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. V, SECTION l, THE
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL IS AN ELECTED OFFICE
WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HAVING BOTH COMMONLAW POWERS AND DUTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES---

8

(A) COMMON-LAW DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL----

12

(B) THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST OPERATE WITHIN THIS
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ELECTED AUTHORITY, EVEN IN FACE OF SUBSEQUENT
STATUTORY INROADS --------------------------POINT II

13

THE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 49-9-3, U.C.A. (1953), AS
AMENDED; SECTION 49-9-10, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED;
SECTION 53-31-46, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, CONTRAVENE
THE PROVISIONS OF ART. VII, SECTION 18, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SECTION 67-5-1,
U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, WHICH MANDATE THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHALL BE THE LEGAL ADVISER FOR STATE
OFFICERS OR COMMISSIONS AND HAVE CHARGE OF.~LL CIVIL
LEGAL MATTERS------------------------------------16

-i-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

PAGE

A. ART. VII, SECTION 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION ESTABLISH THE GENERAL DUTIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL-----------------

16

B. THE MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT ON THIS POINT SUPPORTS THE
INTERPRETATION THAT THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE rs A STATE OFFICER ----------------------

18

C. THE STATE INSURANCE FUND IS NOT A LEGAL
ENTITY, SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE DIRECTOR
OF FINANCE ----------------------------------D. THE AUTHORIZATION BY THE LEGISLATURE TO EMPOWER AGENCIES TO PAY FOR LEGAL SERVICES DOES
NOT CARRY WITH IT THE POWER TO APPOINT LEGAL
COUNSEL -------------------------------------E. THE MANDATORY REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE INSURANCE FUND'S ADMINISTRATOR BY THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OR ONE OF HIS DESIGNEES DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION --------------------------------ARGUMENT --------------------------------------------------POINT I II

20

34

36
39

LEGISLATURES HAVE ENACTED LAWS WHICH MAY BE CONTRARY
TO CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS DELEGATED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR COMMON-LAW POWERS ------------------------ 39
A. SPECIFIC STATUTES - THE UTAH RETIREMENT BOARD
AND UTAH RETIREMENT FUND--

43

B.

46

UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION--------------

-ii-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

PAGE

c.

STATE INSURANCE FUND ---------------------

32

D.

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH FOR UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER ---------------------------

55

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH FOR THE UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER TRUST FUND; FIRST SECURITV BANK OF UTAH, TRUSTEE ----------------

55

F. THE COURT SHOULD NARROWLY CONSTRUE THE
ABOVE STATUTES SO AS TO BE CONSISTENT
WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
MANDATES TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DISCUSSED UNDER ARGUMENTS I AND II-----------

58

E.

G.

THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THE STATUTES EMPOWERING THE RESPONDENTS TO APPOINT LEGAL
COUNSEL UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF THEY CANNOT
BE SO CONSTRUED --------------------------

58

CASES CITED
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission,
73 U. 366, 274 P. 139 --------------------------------

50, 51

Ban S. Kariya Co. ·v. Industrial Commission of
Utah, 67 U. 301, 247 P. 490 (1926) -------------------

21, 22

Chez v. ·Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 U. 447,
62 P.2d 549 (1936) -----------------------------------

20

Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d
397, 403, 137 A.L.R. 803, 811 -----------------------12, 41, 42
Evans v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d
563, 96 P.2d 107, app. dis., 309 U.S. 640, 84 L.Ed.
995, 60 S.Ct. 893 -----------------------------------Fergus V. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 ----------

41
40

-iii-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

PAGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED
Gronning v. Smart, U. 561 P.2d 690 (1977)---------------

20

Hansen v. Barlow, 23 U. 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177-------------

12, 13

Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State
Legislature, 19 U. 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967)--------

18, 19, 20,
54, 55, 57,
58, 59

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 829,165 S.W. 2d 820 ---

40

Johnson v. Jones, 48 S.Dak. 397, 204 N.W. 897 ----------

13

Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County
of Essex, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d 705 ----------

14

Logan City v. Industrial Commission, 85 U. 131, 38 P.2d
769 --------------------------------------------------

52

McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 U. 294, 30 P. 1091 (1892)------

30

Olsen v. Public Service Commission, 129 Mont. 106,
283 P.2d 594 (1955) ----------------------------------

12

State v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 S. 246 ----------------

42

State v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 186 Kans. 190,
350 P.2d 37 -----------------------------------------State of Florida v. Exxon Corp, 1976 5th Cir. 526 F.2d
266 -------------------------------------------------State v. Public Service Commission, 283 P.2d 594 (1955)_State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, U. 576
P.2d 1297 (1978) ------------------------------------Texas Li uor Control Bd. v. Continental Distillin Co.,
99 S. . 2 109 Texas Civ1 App. -------------------

9, 10' 13
40
15
20, 36, 37,
38, 39
44

-iv-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

PAGE

Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. l, 27 S. 2d 524 ----------

40, 41,
42

Woldberg v. Industrial Commission, 74 U. 309, 279
P. 609 (1929) ---------------------------------------

35

STATUTES CITED
Section 35-1-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-------------

53

Section 35-1-32, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------

7, 46, 48,
49, 52

Section 35-1-68, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-----------Section 35-1-69, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-----------Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-------------

54
54
17, 23, 33,
34, 52, 53, 54

Section 35-3-2, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------Section 35-3-20, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-----------Section 35-4-1 through 35-4-26, U.C.A. (1953), as
amended --------------------------------------------Section 35-4-11 (d), U.C.A. (1953), as amended--------

22
36, 38

Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section
Section

43
43
44
32
18,
6,
4,
46,
49,
5,
17,

49-9-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------49-9-4, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------49-9-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------63-2-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------63-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as amended----------67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-------------

Section 67-5-3, U.C.A. (1953), as amended------------Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended-------------

50, 51
50, 52

32, 33
56, 57
7, 16, 24,
47, 48
60
6, 7, 16,
24, 45, 57

-v-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

PAGE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
Utah Constitution, Art. V, Sec. l ---------------------

8, 9

Utah Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 18 ------------------

4,
17,
25,
34,
59

Utah Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 32 -------------------

18, 33

Utah Constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. 11 -----------------

28

Utah Constitution, Art. XXIV, Secs. 1, 12--------------

25

7, 16,
18, 24,
26, 32,
52, 57,

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
.
Constitution Convention, Proceedings Vol II, pp. 10281030, 1154 (1895) -----------------------------------

30

The Federalist, No. VLVII, Vol. l, p. 33 (Cent. L. Jed.
1916) ------------------------------------------------

30

-vi-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v-

)
)

UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
and UTAH STATE RETIREMENT
FUND; UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION, and UTAH STATE
INSURANCE FUND; and UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, for and in
behalf of the UNIVERSITY OF
UTAH HOSPITAL for the UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER;
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
TRUST FUND, FIRST SECURITY·
BANK OF UTAH, TRUSTEE,

Case Nos. 16851, 16714, and
16560

Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal involves the interpretation of the constitutional
and statutory powers of the Attorney General of the State of Utah to
appoint independent legal counsel for State agencies. The State Legislature has enabled some State agencies and State funds to appoint their
own independent counsel, but the Attorney General asserts that the Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Constitution and pertinent statutes implemented in accordance
therewith provide that only the Attorney General has the power
to appoint independent legal counsel for State agencies and funds.
Legislative attempts to the contrary derogate and diminish the clear
constitutional authority of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General appeals from adverse rulings, which,
if allowed to stand, not only misinterpret the constitutional authority of this office, but also approve disturbing inequities, allowing
some agencies and funds to enjoy advantages and capabilities not
shared by a11.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On February 2, 1979, appellant filed this lawsuit in the
District Court of the Third Judicial District, seeking a declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief against all the named defendants:
Utah State Retirement Board ("Retirement Board"); Utah State Retirement Fund ("Retirement Fund"); Utah State Industrial Commission
("Industrial Commission"), and Utah State Insurance Fund ("Insurance
Fund"); University of Utah Hospital ("Hospital"), for the University
Medical Center Trust Fund ("Medical Center Trust Fund"); First Security Bank of Utah ("Bank"), Trustee.

The Complaint alleged that State

agencies, State funds, and quasi-State agencies and funds, by appointing their own legal counsel, were acting in contravention of the
constitutional and statutory authority of the Attorney General.

-2Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Further, that said respondents could only reimburse the Attorney
General if they received Federal funds.
On February 20, 1979, respondents, Retirement Board and
Retirement Fund, filed a Motion to Sever as to all respondents
(R. 8, 9), which was denied on March 2, 1979, by Judge Sawaya
(R. 21) 1n a Memorandum opinion.
On June 5, 1979, Judge Durham granted a Motion for

Su~

mary Judgment (R. 42) in favor of the Medical Center Trust Fund
and respondent, Bank, Trustee.

(R. 70)

In a Memorandum decision dated August 24, 1979, (R. 221),
Judge Durham, treating a Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent,
Insurance Fund, as a Motion for Summary Judgment, granted the same.
On December 14, 1979, Judge Homer F. Wilkinson granted a
Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of respondents, Retirement
Board and Retirement Fund (R. 306, 307).

On December 31, 1979, Judge

Wilkinson also granted a Motion for Sunvnary Judgment in favor of
respondent, Industrial Commission (R. 308, 309, 308A, 3088, and 308C).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This is a consolidated appeal of the above three cases (16560,
16714, and 16851), occasioned by four separate Orders from the ·District
Court by two different judges.

Appellant seeks a reversal of the de-

cisions of the Third Judicial District Court as to all respondents and
the authority they assert to appoint their own 1ega1 counse 1. Appe 11 ant

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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maintains said claimed authority is without merit and unconstitutiona 1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 2, 1979, appellant, the Attorney General of
the State of Utah, filed suit in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, against the Utah State Retirement Board and Utah State Retirement Fund; the Utah State Industrial Commission; the Utah State
Insurance Fund, and the University of Utah, for and in behalf of the
University of Utah Hospital for the University Medical Center Trust
Fund and the First Security Bank of Utah, trustee for the Medical
Center Trust Fund.
The gravamen of the Complaint alleged that the agencies and
the funds, by appointing their own legal counsel, were acting in contravention of the authority of the Attorney General. The authority
of the Attorney General is provided for in Arto VII, Section 18 of the
Utah Constitution, as follows:
"The Attorney General shall be the legal adviser
of the State Officers, and shall perform such other
duties as may be provided by law."
This authority is also provided for in Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953),
as amended, wherein it states the Attorney General shall:
" ... prosecute or defend a 11 causes to which the
state or any officer, board or commission thereof in
an official capacity is a party; and he shall have charge
as attorney of all civil legal matters in which the state
is in anywise interested."
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Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, reads:
"Except where speci fi cal ly authorized by the Utah
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall have the
sole right to hire legal counsel for each such agency.
Unless he hires such legal counsel from outside his office, the attorney general shall remain the sole legal
counsel for that agency. If such outside counsel is
hired for an agency, then that agency must report to the
attorney general for his approval the full costs of this
counsel and the attorney genera 1 sha 11 pay the same. 11
In particular, the Complaint alleged that the Retirement Board
was an independent State agency and that the Retirement Fund was a
quasi-State agency fund.

The Complaint further alleged that the Utah

State Industrial Commission was a State agency, and that the Utah State
Insurance Fund was a quasi-State agency fund created by the Legislature and under the authority of the Finance Commission.
It was further alleged that the University of Utah, for and in
behalf of the University Medical Center, was a medical hospital and
teaching college, authorized by the State Legislature and a State agency.
It was further alleged that the University Medical Center Trust Fund,
administered by First Security Bank as trustee to provide medical malpractice protection to physicians and other medical service individuals
at the University Medical Center and funded, in part, from legislative
appropriations, was a quasi-State agency fund.

It was further alleged

that the enactment of Senate Bill 172 in the 1979 General Session of the
Utah Legislature was an unconstitutional delegation of power in contravention of the authority of the Attorney General.

Senate Bill 172 was
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codified in Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, and, in
pertinent part, reads as follows:
Notwi ths tandi ng any 1aw to the contrary,
the trust agreement between the governmental entity
and the trustee may authorize the trustee to employ
counsel to defend actions against the entity and its
employees and to protect and safeguard the assets of
the trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses and consultants, and to provide such other services and functions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of
the trust.
11

• • •

11

The Attorney General contended that the legislation

(herein~

after specifically cited in the Argument), which established the
State agencies or State quasi-agency funds to the extent they authorized said bodies to appoint, hire, or their agents to so appoint or
hire, usurped the constitutional duties and functions of the Attorney
General in acting as legal adviser to State officers and State agencies
and State-quasi agencies.
Respondents Retirement Fund, Insurance Fund, and the Medical
Center Trust Fund answered that they are independent trusts, receiving
funds from others in addition to the State, and based on their origin
of funds as well as general trust law, they are neither State agencies
nor State.quasi-agency funds and are not, therefore, subject to the Attorney General's constitutional authority to appoint legal counsel for
State officers and State agencies; and that if they are in any way so
controlled, Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, constitutes an

-6-
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exception to said Attorney General's authority.

Section 67-5-5,

in pertinent part, states:
"Except where specifically authorized by the
Utah Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall
hire legal counsel .•..
11

Said respondents maintain that since they are each specifically
governed by statutes which authorize them to have legal counsel,
there is no violation of the Attorney General's authority under
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution; Sections 35-1-32,
67-5-1, or 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Respondents, Hospital, Medical Center Trust Fund, and
Bank filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

With regard to this Motion,

Judge Christine Durham rendered two Orders: the first granted Summary Judgments in favor of the Hospital, for and on behalf of the
Medical Center Trust Fund, and the second in favor of the Insurance
Fund.
Appellant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with supporting
memorandum against the Retirement Board, the Retirement Fund, and the
Industrial Commission.

The Retirement Board and Retirement Fund filed

Motions for Summary Judgment.

The Industrial Commission had in July,

1979, previously filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Judge Homer F.

Wilkinson granted all three Motions for Summary Judgment in favor of
respondents.
Subsequent to the Orders of Judge Durham and while the Motions
before Judge Wilkinson were pending, appellant moved this Court to

-7-
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consolidate all matters for this appeal, and the same was granted
with the final portion of the record being put in place March 24,
1980.

( R. 308A, 3088, 308C)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ADOPTED
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, ART. V, SECTION 1, THE
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL IS AN ELECTED OFFICE WITHIN
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, HAVING BOTH COMMON~LAW POWERS AND
DUTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL DUTIES.
The Attorney General's authority is both as a member of the

Executive Branch of government as well as an officer of court a part
of the Judicial Branch of government.

Therefore, the powers granted

and inherent in his office should not be encroached upon by the Governor,
the Executive Branch, or the Legislature.
Art. V, Section l of the Utah Constitution, provides:
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah sha 11
be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with
the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted."
The Attorney General, in acting as legal adviser for public officers,
functions in an executive role.

Some States appoint their Attorney Gen-

erals, and this is done by constitutional mandate.
as is the case in Utah.

Others are elected,

The Attorney General also gives advice to the

-8-
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judiciary, as he and his staff appear in the various courts of
this State, and as officers of said courts, give legal advice and
guidance.

This concept is illustrated in State v. City of Kansas

City, Kansas, 186 Kans. 190, 350 P.2d 37, in an action of

.9.!!Q.

warranto in a question as to whether the Attorney General could
intervene in the Supreme Court and supersede the county attorney in
an action.

The Kansas Supreme Court, March 5, 1960, at page 42 of

the opinion, says:
We conclude the Attorney General by his motion
to intervene and supersede the county attorney exercised
his powers and duties under the Constitution and appropriate
statutes. This was as far as he could go as an executive
officer and as an attorney and officer of this court. Since
he is an officer of the judicial branch, under the separation
of powers of the three branches of government, he was limited
and restricted in his conduct before this court by the code
of professional ethics ... to the same extent any other lawyer
would be. If, therefore, the Attorney General considered the
action unmeritorious, he not only had the authority, but he
also had a duty to move for dismissal. We cannot think the
framers of our State Constitution or the members of the Legislature ever intended that the Governor should have control
over the judicial branch, or its officers, as is advocated ....
Each of the three branches of our government should be zealous
of its jurisdiction, and each should be vigilant to see that
it does not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the other two .... "
{Emphasis added.)
11

Art. V, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, was not intended
to create three completely autonomous bodies, but was intended to create
three separate branches of government that make up the traditional structure in this country.

Madison commented on the concept in The Federalist,

-9-
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No. XLVII Vol. l, p. 331 (Cent L. Jed 1916):
0•• He /Montesquie/ did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no
control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as
his own words import, and still more conclusively as
illustrated by the example in his eye, can amount to
no more than this, that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess
the whole power of another· department, the fundamental
principles of a free Constitution are subverted .••• "
11

The purpose of an elected Attorney General is to give him
some degree of autonomy as he functions as legal adviser to all State
officers, agencies, quasi-State agencies; State agency funds and quasiState agency funds.

That autonomy must be in the office of the Attorney

Genera 1. This was we 11 illustrated by State v. City of Kansas City,
supra, where it was attempted that the Attorney General would be ordered
to do this or that at the bidding of the Governor, when, in his independent legal judgment and as legal adviser to the State, acting both
for State officers as well as in the best interest of the people of the
State, he may have to move forward with an action separate and distinct
from that desired by, or even ordered by, the Governor.
On the Federal level and in many States, the Attorney General
is appointed rather than elected.

Appellant alleges, therefore, that our

structure for separation of powers as it directly affects the office of
the elected Attorney General in the State of Utah means that the framers
of the Utah Constitution desired that the Attorney General function as a

-10-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

separate legal adviser for the administration of State government
within the Executive Branch but not subservient solely to the Executive Branch, acting as a separate constitutional office.
Each of the departments and divisions of State government
has autonomy and importance.

We ask:

Why is the Attorney General

an elected rather than an appointed officer within the Executive
Branch? The reason is to enable the Attorney General to be answerable
to the public and to respond to the public weal.

His responsibility is

ultimately to those who elect him, as is every elected officer of the
Executive Branch.

If they do not function as desired by the people

of the State of Utah, then a change can be made in that constitutionally
elected office just as that change can be made in any· other elected
official of the State government, starting at the level of Governor.
Under our separation of powers within the State of Utah, the
Legislature cannot adversely affect the executive role of Governor,
except as it does so within the confines of its own constitutionally
delegated powers.

The Legislature is elected and responsible to the pub-

lic at large for its conduct.

By the same token, the Legislature and

its powers cannot be emasculated by the Executive Branch or merely
function as a rubber stamp of the Governor but operates side-by-side
in those separate roles--one creating law and the other having a
responsibility of carrying those laws into effect through the executive
structure of State government.
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Likewise, the Judicial Branch has its autonomy, and it, likewise, serving as elected officials of the State,

is ultimately re-

sponsible to the people.
(A)

COMMON-LAW DUTIES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177, again settled
the question as to whether Utah accepts the doctrine that common-law
powers and duties were in the office of the Attorney General. The Court
stated at page 178:
"However, this Court has repeatedly held that the
Attorney General has common-law powers and duties."
The Court quoting Olsen v. Public Service Commission, 129 Mont. 106,
283 P. 2d 594 (1955), as a case re 1i ed upon, was due to the simi 1ari ty
between the Utah and Montana Cons ti tuti ons
do not have

common~law

on

this subject.

(Other States

powers, such as Idaho and New Mexico.)

Both cases quoted a landmark decision in this field, Darling
Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397, 403, 137 A.L.R.
803, 811, which says:
"The authorities substantially agree that in addition
to those conferred upon it by statute, the office (the
Attorney General) is clothed with all the powers and duties
pertaining thereto at common law; and as chief law officer
of the state, the Attorney General, in the absence of express
legislative restriction to the contrary, may exercise all
such power and authority as the public interests may from
time-to-time require. In short, the Attorney General's powers
are as broad as the common law unles~ restricted or modified
by statute."
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In Hansen v. Barlow, supra, case, the Court concludes:
"After consideration of our Constitution, statutes
and decisions of sister courts, we are of the opinion that it
is within the rights of the Attorney General, if not his duty,
to bring suits to clarify the constitutionality of laws
enacted by the Legislature if it deems it appropriate. He
is in a much more informed, duty entrusted, and advantageous
position to do so than the individual citizen and taxpayer."
Hansen v. Barlow, supra, was brought by the Attorney General
to determine the rightness and constitutionality of legislative enactments, which encroach upon his constitutional and statutory authority.
In Hansen v. Barlow, supra, both the questiorsof the Attorney General
having common-law powers and having the right and duty to make this type
of determination, are set at rest.
B. · THE ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST OPERATE WITHIN THIS
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ELECTED AUTHORITY, EVEN IN FACE OF SUBSEQUENT
STATUTORY INROADS.
Hansen v. Barlow, supra, well illustrates the necessity for
the Attorney General, by virtue of his inherent authority, to initiate
actions to determine whether legislative amendments are right or constitutional.

The Attorney General further has a duty to intervene as illus-

trated by State v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, supra, and this responsibility
is further illustrated by a South Dakota case where Judge Campbell, in
Johnson v. Jones, 48 S.Dak. 397, 204 N.W. 897, says:
"Viewing all sections together, we believe the most
ljberal construction that could be placed upon the
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authority granted by Section 5 of the original Act to
1
emp1 oy attorneys '· would be to ho 1d that the boa rd
authorized to employ attorneys for mere routine matters
requiring the services of an attorney, but not requiring
the rendering of legal advice or opinions upon points
of law, or matters of legal right or policy of the board,
and we think that any such attorneys so employed would
be under the supervision, control, and direction of the
Attorney General as general legal adviser of the board.o.

II

There was a conflict between the allowance by statute of
a board to have legal counsel and the Attorney General's power to appoint.

The Court resolved the conflict reserving certain authority in

the Attorney General and showing that there must be a limitation so as
not to improperly encroach upon the general powers of the Attorney
General, as legal adviser--not only for the board but for all State
officers.
In Keenan v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Essex, 101 N.J. Super. 495, 244 A.2d 705, the Court said, at page 711:
• • • The exclusive right of the Attorney General
to
represent the State agency .• was derived from that official common-law status as the legal representative of
the sovereign and his historic identification with the
public interest. Therefore, he exercises 'all such power
and authority as the public interest may from time-to-time
require' in the absence of 'express legislative restriction
to the contrary. '"
11

o

In that case the Superior Court of New Jersey held that the County
Superintendent of Elections, also a Commissioner of Registration as an
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officer of State government, does not have the power to appoint
legal counsel of his own choosing in contravention of the Attorney
General and his common-law powers.
In State v. Public Service Commission, 283 P.2d 594 (1955),
the Court held that the fact the Attorney General was the attorney for
the State Public Service Commission did not affect his right or duty
to institute proceedings to set aside telephone rates as fixed by the
Commission.

The Court held that the Attorney General has the power

within his office, by virtue of this constitutional and common-law
power,

to proceed against public officers to require them to perform

duties which they owe to the public in general and to set aside such
· action as shall be determined to be in excess of their authority. and to
have them compelled to execute their authority in accordance with law.
If the Attorney General, as a constitutional office and as an
elected official, does not have the reasonable autonomy to function within
the office and under the common-law powers granted and within the framework of the separation of powers of the Utah Constitution, both the Legislature and the Executive Branch, through the Governor, could make inroads
that would deeply violate these fundamental constitutional principles.
The results could be adverse to the wishes of the electorate to whom the
Attorney General and all other elected officials are responsible and
would be violative of the constitutional grant of authority and the will
of those who created the Constitution in the move from a territorial to a
statehood status.

This is additionally illustrated by Argument II.
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ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE PROVISIONS IN SECTION 49-9-3, U.C.A. _
(1953), AS AMENDED; SECTION 49-9-10, U.C.A.
(1953), AS AMENDED; SECTION 53-31-46, U.C.A.
(1953), AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 63-30~28,
U.C.A .. (1953), AS AMENDED, CONTRAVENE THE
PROVISIONS OF ART. VII, SECTION 18, OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SECTION
67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED, WHICH MANDATE THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL SHALL BE THE
LEGAL ADVISER FOR STATE OFFICERS OR COMMIS=
SIONS AND HAVE CHARGE OF ALL CIVIL LEGAL MATTERS.
~ART. VII, SECTION 18 OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION
ESTABLISH THE GENERAL DUTIES AND AUTHORITIES OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, creates and
prescribes the duties of the Attorney General. Section 18 provides:
"The attorney general shall be the legal adviser of the State officers and shall perform such
other duties as may be provided by law.
11

Section

67~5-l,

U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides that the

general duties of the Attorney General require him to:
prosecute or defend all causes to which
the state or any officer, board or commission
thereof in an official capacity is a party; and
he shall have charge as attorney of all civil legal
matters in wh,ich the state is in anywise interested.
11

•••

11

Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, reads:
Except where speci fi ca 1ly authorized by the Utah
Constitution, or statutes, no agency shall hire legal
counsel, and the attorney general alone shall hdve the
11
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sole right to hire legal counsel for each such
agency. Unless he hires such legal counsel~
from outside his office, the attorney general
shall remain the sole legal counsel for that agency.
If such outside counsel is hired for an agency, then
that agency must report to the attorney general for his
approval the full costs of this counsel and the attorney general shall pay the same.
11

Each of the respondents claims statutory authority,
separate from the Attorney General's Office, to hire or appoint independent legal counsel.

Illustrative of this is the claim of the

State Insurance Fund, Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
which reads, in partinent part, as follows:
In the conduct and administration of the
business of said fund the commission of finance
may appoint with the approval of the governor, a
manager, and may employ accountants, inspectors,
attorneys, physicians, investigators, clerks, stenographers, and such other experts and assistants as it
deems advisable.
11

11

The above language is in direct conflict with the language
of Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.

Given this conflict

between State statutes and the cited constitutional provisions, this
Court must declare the

stat~te

unconstitutional should it conclude, as

urged here, that the Director of the Department of Finance (Director
of Finance shall herein refer to the Commission of Finance) is a State
officer and administrator of the State Insurance Fund.
B.

THE MOST RECENT PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE UTAH
SUPREME COURT ON THIS POINT SUPPORTS THE
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INTERPRETATION THAT THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE
IS A STATE OFFICER.
In Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State
Legislature, 19 Utah 2d 231, 429 P.2d 979 (1967), the Attorney
General for the State of Utah, Phil L. Hansen, brought suit, challenging the constitutionality of the Legal Services Committee of the
State Legislature.

The question raised by the Attorney General was

whether the State Legislature, by enactment of a statute, could hire
its own independent legal adviser.

The Court held that the legisla=

tors are State officers within the meaning of Art. XXIV, Section 12,
of the Utah Constitution, for whom the Attorney General alone serves
as legal adviser (Art. VII, Section 18).

Hence, the Court struck down

the statute which attempted to circumvent Art. VII, Section 18.· Subsequently, the Legislature, in order to accomplish its purposes, was
forced to amend the Utah Constitution.

The amendment (Art. VI, Section

32), provides:
"The Legislature may appoint temporary or
permanent nonmember employees for work during
and between sessions, including independent legal
counsel which shall provide and control all legal
services for the Legislature except as the Legislature b law shall authorize erformance thereof by
the attorney general." Emphasis added.
The Department of Finance was first created in 1941 and placed
under the supervision of a three-member commission.

A 1963 amendment to

Section 63-2-2, U.C.A. (1953), substituted the provisions for creation of
the office of director of finance for provisions relating to the former
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corrmission of finance.
The Court in Hansen perceived the Legislature's actions
as an attempt to emasculate the powers and diminish the duties of
the Attorney General.

The Court noted in its opinion that, on at

least eight previous occasions, similar attempts had been thwarted:
"Certain pressures tried to abolish the office
of the Attorney General as a member of the Board of
Examiners, by constitutional amendment at the election last year. The people turned down that attempt,
along with seven others, by a thumping 70% vote because apparently they thought our Constitution borne
by the seat of its framers in an unairconditioned
building did a pretty good job which has served the
commonwea 1th pretty we 11 . " ( 19 Utah 2d at 232, 429,
P.2d at 980)

In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized the dangerous ramifications of a contrary ruling which would allow the

Leg~slature

to encroach upon the Attorney General's constitutional grant of powers.
The instant case highlights the continuing attempts to reduce the Attorney General's powers by allowing a State agency, State
trust fund, a State director (or commission), or a quasi-State agency
or fund, rather than the Legislature, to hire independent legal counsel.
The question is the same; only the parties have changed.

The quintes-

sential issue still emerges as whether the constitutional grant of power
to the Attorney General may be emasculated or diminished, allowing appointed or lesser-elected State officers to do the very things that the
Legislature cannot do.

Such an impermissible result was anticipated by

Hansen, as the following observation aptly reveals:
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If the l egi s 1atu re, by fiat, could create its
own legal adviser, then logic would say it could
create 50 or more others for itself, each of which,
of course, would have to have secretaries and other
personnel. Such legislation could be extended to
legal advisers for the Governor, State Auditor,
Treasurer, Secretary of State and everyone else,
in which event the office of Attorney General effectively could be emasculated and rendered impotent.
We believe the framers of the Constitution had no
such intention in mind under our tri-partite system
of government." (19 Utah 2d at 233, 429 P.2d at
980) (Emphasis added.)
11

The Court's deliberate use of the open-ended phrase "and everyone
else" is sufficiently broad to encompass the appointed and lesserelected State officers, since such' officers usually belong to the Executjve Branch of which the Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary
of State are the chief officers. The former are agents of the latter.
C.

THE STATE INSURANCE FUND IS NOT A LEGAL ENTITY,
SEPARATE AND APART FROM THE DIRECTOR OF FINANCE.

The State Insurance Fund consists of private monies collected
as premiums from employers to provide insurance coverage for employee injuries and diseases (which are work-related and covered by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, cite).

On several occasions this Court has re-

ferred to the State Insurance Fund as being analogous to private insurers.
State Tax Commission v. Department of.Finance, Utah 576 P.2d 1297 (1978};
Gronning v. Smart, Utah 561 P.2d 690 (1977); and Chez v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 90 Utah 447, 62 P.2d 549 (1936).

A fundamental differ-

ence, however, between the State Insurance Fund and private insurance
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enterprises is that the latter enjoys legal standing while the
former does not.

Private insurers are generally corporations or

partnerships with legal standing, but the State Insurance fund
per se, in a strict legal sense, is little more than an inanimate
collection of funds.
The most authoritative source for the rule just cited
is Ban S. Kariya Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 67 Utah 301,
247 P. 490 (1926).

In Ban S. Kariya Co., the Court was initially

asked to review the action of the Industrial Commission in awarding
compensation to the widow and surviving children of an employee who
was accidentally killed while working on the job. The deceased's employer belonged to the State Insurance Fund.
Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Review.

The employer later filed a
The defendant widow and

minor children also interposed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Review.
The widow and minor children argued, in part, that the State Insurance
Fund did not possess

legal capacity to petition for such a review.

In granting the Motions to Dismiss and to Quash, the Court agreed that
the State Insurance Fund was without legal standing and stated:
"The effort of the Legislature by the amendment of
1921 to give the state insurance fund the right to appear
as a party to have an award of the Commission reviewed must
be held to be nugatory and of no effect. We have endeavored
to point out that the Legislature has in no way attempted to
make, nor has it made, the state insurance fund an independent
entity disassociated from the Industrial Commission. The
fund is not given any of the powers usually provided or
deemed necessary for the functioning of a body corporate.
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the question is who shall appoint legal counsel to represent
the Director of Finance in matters concerning its administrative actions and conduct while acting in his official capacity.
Hence, regardless of the source or nature of its monies, the
Insurance Fund only becomes a legal entity for purposes of representation when joined with its public administrator, the
Director of Finance.
As was successfully argued by the Attorney General before the Utah Supreme Court in Hansen, Art. VII, Section 18 of
the Utah Constitution, really contains two parts:
the Attorney General

11

the first makes

the legal adviser for State officers. 11 The

second part of Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, provides that he" ... shall perform such other duties as may be provided by law.

11

The Legislature, in Section

67-5~ 1,

U.C.A. (1953),

as amended, statutorily empowered the Attorney General to "prosecute
or defend all causes to which the state or any officer, board or commission thereof in an official capacity is a party. 11
Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, vests in the
Attorney General the sole right to hire legal counsel for State
agencies, except for those cases in which another procedure is specifically authorized by statute.
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Clear and substantial evidence exists to support
the inclusion of the Director of Finance within the ranks of
"State officers for whom the Attorney General serves as legal
11

adviser.

It should be noted that the "State officers" referred

to in Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, are not
necessarily the elected executive, judicial, and legislative
officials enumerated in Art. XXIV, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

Art. XXIV, Section 12, provides:
"The State Officers to be voted for at the
time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall
be a Governor, ·secretary of State, State Auditor,
State Treasurer, Attorney General, Superintendent
of Public Instruction, Members of the Senate and
House of Representatives, three Supreme Judges,
nine District Judges, and a Representative to
Congress." (Emphasis added.)

Art. XXIV was designed and written to facilitate a smooth transition from a territorial to a State government.

The transitional

nature of Art. XXIV is unmistakably expressed in the language of
Art. XXIV, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which states, in
. part:
"In order that no inconvenience may arise,
by reason of the change from a Territorial to a
State Government... . "
In other words, the specific purpose of Art. XXIV, Section 12, was
to list those State officers "to be voted for at the time of the
adoption of (the) Constitution," rather than to name the State

-25Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

officers whom the Attorney General was to advise legally. Had
the latter purpose been intended, Section 12 would have been more
correctly worded as follows:
"The State officers to whom the Attorney General
shall serve as legal adviser, shall be ••..
11

The implication that the "State officers" referred to
in Article VII, Section 18, coincide with the "State officers to
be voted for at the time of the adoption of

{th~

Article XXIV, Section 12, first arose in Hanseno

Constitution.
The painstaking

distinctions made in this analysis of Art. VII, Section 18, were apparently not considered and were understandably not necessary in
light of the question presented in Hanseno The core question on appeal there was whether State legislators were to be considered "State
officers" within the meaning of Art. VII, Section 18. State legislators
under even the strictest definitions would generally be classified as
"State officers." Thus, the elected officials enumerated in Art.
XXIV, Section 12, are "State officers" because of the nature and scope
of their official duties, rather than because they happened to be included in that particular section of the Constitution. We further submit that the only fair and reasonable reading of the reference to Art.
XXIV, Section 12, in Hansen, is that of a constitutional citation which
supported the virtually self-evident conclusion that legislators are
State officers.
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The question then becomes whether the Constitution contemplates that the Attorney General should only serve as the legal
adviser to the elected officials who were voted for at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, or whether its language is sufficiently broad to encompass subsequently elected and appointed State
officials. At the time of the adoption of the State Constitution,
it was wholly true that the Attorney General was only serving as
legal adviser to the State officers who existed.

Recognition of

that fact, nevertheless, does not mean that the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate that the number of elected and appointed
State officials, especially in the Executive Branch, would necessarily expand to keep pace with the advance of time and increase of
population.

Nor does it suggest that the framers ever·· anticipated

that subsequently elected or appointed State officers would not be
transacting business or exercising authority under the guise of power
derived from the sovereignty of the State.
If the position is taken that the Utah Constitution, as
presently worded, contemplates as State officers only those elected
officials expressly mentioned in Art. XXIV, Section 12, then irrational
and bothersome incongruities surface.

For instance, since Art. XXIV,

Section 12, has never been amended, we must presume that the Attorney
General serves as the legal adviser to a position now defunct (representative to Congress).

Even a more strained interpretation is the

-27Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

conclusion that only three of the five current justices to the
Utah Supreme Court could legally be advised by the Attorney

General~

and only nine of the current sitting district judges would be privy
to the same benefit. The question must also be raised whether the
1912 amendment to the Utah Constitution, whereby the office of
Superintendent of Public Instruction was made an appointive rather
than an elective position, nullified the superintendent's right to
receive legal advice from the Attorney General. And what about
oth_er appointive offices subsequently created by constitutional
amendment, such as Art. XIII, Section 11, which authorizes the
creation of the State Tax Commission.

Could one in good conscience

argue that officials who are constitutionally delegated the power
"to administer and supervise the tax laws of the State" are not "State
officers?" Moreover, how can the choice of words in Art. VII, Section 10, concerning the Governor's appointive power be hannonized with
the State officer definition of Art. XXIV, Section 129 if appointed
officials are excluded? The former provision states:
"The Governor sha 11 nominate, and by and with consent of the Senate~ appoint all State and district officers whose offices are established by this Constitution,
or which may be created.by law~·and whose appointment or
electicrn is not otherwise provided for." (Emphasis added.)
Such examples are but a sampling of the inconsistencies that
one must reconcile if he elects to assume the position that the Constitution contemplates the Attorney General will be the legal adviser only
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to those "State officers" who were "voted for at the time of the
adoption of

Lth~

Constitution, --a position taken by Judge Dur-

ham in the lower court.

11

(On oral argument)

Additional persuasive evidence follows to support the argument that the Director of Finance is a "State officer" within the
contemplation of the Utah Constitution.

First, the Constitutional

Convention considered the position of Attorney General and seemed to
indicate that the primary duty would be advising State officers.
The convention members also recognized that additional duties would
be provided by the Legislature. Although the convention's central focus
was on the Attorney General's salary, direct comments were made, indicating that the Attorney General would supervise "the legal business
in behalf of the State." This same thought appears several times in a
short dialogue on the floor between two delegates to the convention:
"MR. CHIDESTER: Yes, I presume it is, but I believe
that this reaches further, if it is contemplated by
this section that the attorney general shall conduct the
legal business in behalf of the State, such as prosecuting
and the like of that, he could not begin to do it for
that sum. Was that the intention?
"MR. VARIAN: The duties of the Attorney General, Mr.
Chairman, would be as suggested, to advise the State
officers, attend to all business, criminal and otherwise,
of the State in the Supreme Court. But in exceptional cases,
he might be invited and might go out into a county to
assist in the prosecution of some important matter. They
generally do that, but they are not obliged to.
"MR. CHIDESTER: Under the present system, there is to be
several deputies or assistant prosecuting attorneys, would
he have to pay them himself?
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MR0 VARIAN: No. I think the gentleman misapprehends ito There will be a system of county or dis~
trict attorneys who will attend to all matters of the
kind indicated in the nisi prius courtso The Attorney General simply takes the cases on appeal-=briefs
them, and argues them in the appellate court. lf.
there are any civil cases to which the State would be
a party, it would be his duty to bring them or defend
them, as the case might be.
(Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 1895,
Vol. II, page 1028.) (Emphasis added.)
11

11

If, indeed, it were contemplated that the Attorney General should supervise all the legal business of the State, then this implies the inclusion of appointed and lesser elected officials who engage in State
business as "State officers."
Second, in McCormick v·. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294, 30 P.1091
(1892), the Court held that the members of the Board of Trustees of

the State Agricultural College were State officers.

The Court defined

the elements of being an officer in terms of the duties and powers exercised. The Court's ruling lends support to the conclusion that the term
"State officers 11 as used in Art. VII, Section 18, was intended to encompass all officials exercising the sovereign powers of the State.
Third, both the more comprehensive and the more restrictive
definitions of "State officer" as stated in Words and Phrases would sustain the classification of the Director of Finance as a State officer.
Two liberal constructions define "State officer" as follows:
A 'state officer' is one created l5y the Legislature or established by the Constitution. Williams
11
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v. Guerre, 162 So. 609, 182 La. 745.
Phrases, page 76)

(Words and

"In a sense, a 'state officer' is one whose
jurisdiction, duties, and functions are coextensive
with the State, and who receives his authority under
State laws and performs some of the governmental functions of the State." Texas Liquor Control Bd. v. Continental Distillin Sales Co., Tex. Cfv. App., 199 S.W.
2d 1009, 1012. Words and Phrases, page 76)
In contrast, one of the narrowest definitions of "State officer" reads:
"The tenn 'state officers' may be construed as
meaning only heads of the executive departments of the
State elected by the people at large, such as Governor,
Lieutenant Governor, State Treasurer, Secretary of
State, Attorney General, and the like, that being its
particular meaning, or given its more comprehensive sense,
including every person whose duties appertain to the State
at large, according to the legislative intention; that the
exact sense in which the term is used in any particular law
must often be determined by ordinary rules for judicial construction. Applying the rules that effects and consequences
are to be regarded in construing a law, where the words
thereof will admit of either of two reasonable meanings,
the court held that in the law in question the words 'any
of the state officers' should be restrained to heads of
department having their official residence at the State
Capitol, and expected to keep open office there during business hours, and generally speaking to be there themselves;
that is, that the term was used by the lawmakers in its narrow
and particular, instead of its broad and general, sense.
State ex rel. Williams v. Samuelson, 111 N.W. 712-715, 131
Wis. 499, citing and approving State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical
College v. Chittenden, 107 N.W. 506, 127 Wis. 468. Words
and Phrases, page 79.
11

The Director of Finance's powers and duties are an exercise of governmental powers coextensive with the State.

The Director further qualifies

as a State officer under the more restrictive definition since he is the
-31-
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head of the Department of Finance, which department has its official residence at the State Capitol and maintains an open office
with regular hours.
It is urged upon this Court that the clear evidence is
to the effect the Director of the Department of Finance be considered
in his own right a "State officer" within the contemplation of the
Utah Constitution. Also, the Director of Finance may still be found
to be a "State officer" under Art. VII, Section 18, upon the theory
that the Director is a direct agent of the Governor..

The express pro=

visions of Sections 63-2-1 and 63-2-2, Utah Code Anna (1953), as amended,
clearly enunciate the agency relationship between the Governor and the
Department of Finance (or the director as the department s head)..
1

Utah

Code Ann., SectTon 63-2-1 (1953), as amended, reads:
"Department of finance created--Construction of
authorities and duties imposed.--There is created a
department to be known as the department of finance
attached to the office of the governor to assist the
governor in the execution of his constitutional duties
as the state's chief executive officer and which shall
perform such duties and functions as may be prescribed
by law ..... and prescribing other budgetary functions
under the constitutional authority of the state's chief
executive to transact all executive business for the
state, as differentiated from the examination of claims
as may be exercised by the board of examiners."
. (Emphasis added.}
Section 63-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, reads:
"Appointment of director of finance--Duties--Oath-Salary and expenses.--The administration of the department
shall be under the supervision, direction and control of a
director who shall be known as the director of financeo
The director of finance shall be the state's chief fiscal
officer; and ex officio, the state's budget officer, the
state's ersonnel officer, the state's urchasin a ent,
an the state ~ accounti~g O i~er. The director o inance
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shall be appointed by the governor by and with
the consent of the Senate and shall serve at the
will and pleasure of the governor .... 11
(Emphasis added.)
The unequivocal language of the statutes confirms that
the Director of Finance is the Governor's primary agent in State
fiscal matters.

In fact, Section 63-2-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953},

as amended, goes so far as to.designate the Director of Finance as
11

the State's chief fiscal officer." Again the question is raised:

Why should agents be allowed to do things that their principals are
constitutionally prohibited from doing? The Governor may not hire
his own independent legal counsel; the Utah Constitution mandates
that the Attorney General shall serve as the Governor's legal adviser.
What sense could there be in permitting the Governor's agent to circumvent a clear constitutional prohibition for the purpose of_ doing
the very thing that the Governor himself cannot do.

This "backdoor

approach," aimed at usurping the Attorney General's constitutionally
conferred power to appoint legal counsel, will certainly be perceived
by the Court for what it really is.

Hence, until such time as the Utah

Constitution is amended to provide otherwise, "State officers," which
include the Director of Finance and other State boards, commissions,
departments and agencies (with the sole exception of the State Legislature (Art. VI, Section 32), must procure their legal advice and assistance under the supervision of the Attorney General.

For these

reasons, Section 35-3-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953}, must be declared, in
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part, unconstitutional, as being in contravention of Arto VII9
Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.

D. THE AUTHORIZATION BY THE LEGISLATURE TO
EMPOWER AGENCIES TO PAY FOR LEGAL SERVICES
DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT THE POWER TO APPOINT
LEGAL COUNSEL.
Because legislation authorizes that certain State agencies
or government-related agencies are authorized to pay for legal services
or accounting services from the funds of their agency9 does not,
therefore; mean they alone have the right or power to appoint said
legal counsel for the agency or board where there is clear constitutional authority for the Attorney General to do so.
The present wording of the Utah statutes suggests the potential that the Attorney General's office could be in a conflict of interest with respect to its obligation to defend the Industrial Commission and State Insurance Fund (Department of Finance).
Admittedly, conflict of interest problems could arise in
those situations in which the Attorney General's office represents the
Industrial Corrmission on one side as administrator of the "Second Injury
Fund" and the adverse interests of the State Insurance Fund on the other
side.

It should be noted, however, that this particular conflict of in-

terest has not always existed, rather its origin may be traced back to
a legislative amendment in 1941, whereby the Commission of Finance replaced the Industrial Commission as administrator of the State Insurance Fund. Although the existing conflict between the Industrial Commission
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and the State Insurance Fund (Department of Finance) did not
exist then, an apparent conflict of interest was attrtbuted_to the
Industrial Conmission for its allegedly adverse roles of adjudieating claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act and administering the State Insurance Fund.

This was the precise issue in the

case of Woldberg v. ·Industrial ·corilmission, 74 Utah 309,
whi~h

27~

P.609 (1929), to

the Court responded:
"The Industrial Commission is no less an administrative body when making awards binding upon the State
Insurance Fund than it is when making awards binding
upon other insurance carriers. Nor is the commission
disqualified because of interest from making awards
against or in favor of the State Insurance Fund. The
Commission is an arm of the State Government charged
with the duty of administering the Workmen's eompensation Act. Its members have no financial interest in
the fund. Their salaries are not paid out of it, and
their compensation is neither increased nor diminished
because of anything they may do or not do with respect
to it. The authorities cited by app 1i cant ( 33 C.J.
991, note 54, 1023; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.
Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed 749, 50 A.L.R. 1243) have no application
to the situation here." ·woldberg, at page 611.

The alleged conflict of interest in Woldberg was with the Industrial
Commission, whereas the conflict shifted to the Attorney General's Office
in 1941 when the words "of Finance" were added to the word "Commission"
(which previously referred to the Industrial Commission).

The conflict

arises because the Attorney General's office is statutorily required to
defend both the Industrial Commission and the Commission of Finance.
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(See Section 35-3-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953).)
It is respectfully submitted that this potential conflict of interest was not foreseen by the Legislature in 1941 when
it amended Chapter 3 of Title 35.
Therefore, until the Legislature clears up this potential
for conflict in the existing statutes, the Attorney General must,
within the responsibility and bounds of his constitutional authority,
act to appoint, as in the past, fair legal representation of conflic=
ting interests or agencies with State governmento The fact alone
of potential for conflict of interest must not here control a decision
which should be made on constitutional grounds and should be consistent
with court determinations as to those powers of the Attorney General of
the State of Utah, as is well expressed in the HansS'l case, supra.
E.

THE MANDATORY REPRESENTATION OF THE STATE
INSURANCE FUND.'S ADMINISTRATOR BY THE AT=
TORNEY GENERAL OR ONE OF HIS DESIGNEES
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

In State Tax Commission v. Department of Finance, 576 P.2d 1297
(.1978}, the State Tax Commission brought suit against the State Department of Finance as administrator of the State Insurance Fund, for its
refusal to pay an additional percent tax on the total premiums received
into the Fund, above and beyond the uncontested three- and one-fourth
percent tax on premiums required of all companies providing Workmen's
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Compensation Insurance in Utah.

The Utah Supreme Court held in favor

of the Department of Finance, ruling that no rational basis could
be cited to distinguish between the State Insurance Fund and
private insurers for the purpose of extracting an unequal or higher
tax from the State Insurnace Fund.
be sound and well founded.

The Court's decision appears to

Indeed, the private monies which are paid

into the State Insurance Fund are no different than the private monies
paid to private insurers.

Hence, no discernible basis exists to impose

a higher tax on the publicly administered fund.
It is one thing, however, to say that no rational basis exists
.to di sti ngui sh between the State· Insurance Fund and private insurers
for tax purposes, and it is quite another thing to say that no rational
basis exists to distinguish between the two for purposes of legal representation. Whereas, the fact that a fund of private monies is administered
by a State officer or department may have little bearing on the validity
of a tax levied against that private money, the fact of public administration may be decisive in determining the question of who shall appoint
legal counsel for the administrator of the fund.

The Court acknowledged

in State Tax Commission that the State Insurance Fund is publicly administered.

The Court stated:
"The only distinguishable feature is that the Fund
is administered by a State agency, the cost therefor being
paid from the premiums. This feature is not a rational
basis to treat th.e Fund as a distinct classification."
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We respectfully submit that the proper interpretation of the Court's
language is circumscribed by the factual setting of that particular
case. While the administration of the State Insurance Fund by the
Department of Finance may serve as no basis for unequal tax classifications, it arguably serves as a very rational basis for compelling
a State officer to be represented by the Attorney General in actions
concerning his conduct while acting in his official capacity as administrator of the State Insurance Fund.

Thus9 the important factual

differences between State Tax Commission and the instant case prevent
the rules of law pronounced in State Tax Commission from being mechanically applied here.
If the Court elects to apply the holding of State Tax Commission in the instant case, and in effect states that no substantive difference exists between the State Insurance Fund and private insurers
for any matter, the Court may later

oe

haunted by the constitutional

repercussions of such a decree. The basis for this bold prediction is
as follows:

It is inconsistent to say that the fact the State Insurance

Fund is "publicly administered"is an insufficient basis for a reasonable
classification between the Fund and private insurers, and then on the
other hand, use the "publicly administered" argument to justify Section
35-3-20, Utah Code Ann. (1953), which allows the Director of Finance to
have the Attorney General represent him in suits concerning his actions
as administrator of the fund.

If the State Insurance Fund, along with the

actions of the State officer who administers the fund are to be considered
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the same as private insurers, then the Fund should not be able to
procure the services of the Attorney General--even if such services
are paid for exclusively by the Fund--since private insurers may not
hire or use the Attorney General's services for private matters unrelated to the public interest.

The same reasoning extends to serv-

ices rendered by the State Auditor, State Treasurer, or other State
officials and employees who presently assist in the administration of
the State Insurance Fund. To hold otherwise would be to sustain a
11

reverse 11 or 11 counter 11 unequal operation of the laws.

The "publicly

administered" argument cannot be a valid underpinning in one situation and then be unconstitutional in the other. Therefore, we submit that the rule of State Tax Commission is not controlling in the
instant case, and further submit that the mandatory representation
of the Director of Finance by the Attorney General in matters concerning his administration of the State Insurance Fund is both
proper and constitutional, and, therefore, the ruling of the lower
court, Judge Durham, should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
LEGISLATURES HAVE ENACTED LAWS WHICH MAY BE CONTRARY
TO CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS DELEGATED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR COMMON-LAW POWERS.
The power of the Legislature to enact statutes affecting the
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functions of the office of the Attorney General do not extend to
stripping him of all powers and leaving his office an empty shell.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 829 165 S.W. 2d 820.

Neither the

Legislature nor the courts can deprive the.Attorney General of the
authority which the State Constitution has granted him.

People ex

rel. Castle v. Daniels, 8 Ill. 2d 43, 132 N.E. 2d 507.

The Legis=

lature can abridge only such powers of the Attorney General as it
may have added to those which were inherent in the office at common
law, which powers themselves must remain inviolate as long as the constitutional grant continues.

Fergus v. Russell, 270 Ill. 304, 110

N.E. 130.
A common provision in State Constitutions and statutes makes
the Attorney General the legal adviser of various departments, officers,
agencies, and specifies those which he serves as said legal adviser.
Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 19 27 S. 2d 524.

Further, a statutory

grant of power possessed by an Attorney General does not normally deprive him of other common-law powers.
1976 5th Circuit, 526 F.2d 266.

State of Florida v. Exxon Corp.,

The question here was whether the

Florida Attorney General had power to institute suit under Federal law
without specific authorization of individual government entities which
allegedly had sustained legal injuries.

The Fifth Circuit Court held

that, under Florida law, the Attorney General may institute all legal
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proceedings necessary to protect the interests of the State.
Even in the absence of specific provisos, it has been
held that the Attorney General may be tacitly recognized as the
legal adviser or representative of State agencies.

Darling Apart-

ment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 22 A.2d 397.
Other court rulings have held that a specific provision
requiring the Attorney General to be the adviser or representative
for State agencies and officers does not impose on him a duty to
so serve if the agency is acting in a proprietary rather than a
governmental capacity.

Watson v. Caldwell, 158 Fla. 1, 27 So. 2d

524.
There is authority for the proposition that if a statute
creating a State office or department and setting forth its powers
and functions, expressly authorizes the hiring of an attorney, that
in making that appointment, the department or State office acts validly
unless it violates a prohibition of the State Constitution.
Superior Court of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 563, 96 P.2d 107,

Evans v.
!Q.P_.

dis., 309 U.S. 640, 84 L.Ed. 995, 60 S.Ct. 893, where a statute, authorizing a building and loan commissioner to employ special counsel to
assist him in liquidating a building and loan association, was sustained.
There is also authority as previously cited in Watson v.
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Caldwell, supra, that a specific grant of authority to a State
commission or agency to sue or be

sued~

or to engage in litiga-

tion, has within it an implied authority for a said agency or
commission to appoint and procure its own counselo

See also

State v. Allen, 172 La. 350, 134 S. 246.
Contra to this position, it has been held that a Legislature has no power to give the State Insurance Department or the
Superintendent of said Department power to conduct the liquidation
in reference to insurance companies, which has been before that
time a duty of the Attorney General under a Constitution providing
that the executive department should consist of certain officers,
including the Attorney General, and that they shall "perform such
du ti es as may be prescribed by 1aw.

11

Fergus v. Russe 11 , 270 I 11.

304, 110 N.E. 130.

In deciding the question of legislative authority to
encroach on the powers and duties of the Attorney General, the language of the statute must be considered in the light of the office
of the Attorney General at common law and the general understanding
of the nature of this office in its role, including public policy that
has occurred over a period of years.

Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer,

supra.
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A. SPECIFIC STATUTES - THE UTAH RETIREMENT BOARD
AND UTAH RETIREMENT FUND

The Utah State Retirement Board was established by
authority of Senate Bill 94 passed March 14, 1963, effective
July l, 1963, Ch. 74, Laws of Utah 1963, and Ch. 49-9-1, U.C.A.
(1953), as amended, providing:
"The retirement office shall be an independent
state agency and not a division within any other
department. It shall be subject to the usual legislative and executive department controls. The retirement office shall be housed at the seat of the
Utah State government."
The designation that the Retirement Board be at the seat
of State government rather than the State Capitol was the effect of
the 1973 amendment.

Section 49-9-4 (9) of this authorization reads:

"(9) To employ within the limitations of said
budget such staff personnel and consultants as is deemed
necessary to administer the retirement systems and
funds assigned to the retirement office for administration. Such personnel may include actuaries, attorneys,
medical examiners, investment counselors, accountants,
and such clerical and other assistants as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose of the retirement office.
Compensation of the director shall be established by the
board. 11
The Retirement Board and the Retirement Fund that the Board
administers are, by the words set forth in the authorization, State
agencies or perhaps in contrast to constitutionally established rather
than legislative established agencies, a quasi-State agency or fund.
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The Retirement Board, respondent, denies the authority of the
Attorney General to appoint or hire legal counsel for the Board
or Fund and cites the statutory authority herein set forth as
their authority to appoint their own attorneys and pay for them
from the proceeds of the Fund.
The Board further maintains that the Fund is a "common
trust fund" created by the Legislature, and that the Board exists
as a "trustee of said fund."

Many cases on this subject matter

throughout the country draw a line between the legal work done and
the proprietary or administrative work done.

It is the assertion

of the appellant that Section 49-9-5, U.CoA. (1953), as amended, is
speaking about .. ministerial duties" of accountants and attorneys,
actuaries, medical examiners, investment counselors and clerks and
assistants.
Texas Liquor Control Board v. Continental Distilling Co.,
199 S.W. 2d 109 (Texas Civil App.), states:
"In a sense, a state officer is one whose
jurisdiction, duties, and functions are coextensive with the state and receives his authority under state laws and performs some of the
governmental functions of the state."
Appellant urges upon the Court that it be interpreted necessarily

~he

respondents, Retirement Board and Retirement Fund, may, ac-

cording to their authorization, appoint such personnel as is required
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for the in-house administrative or proprietary actions that
are required.

Appellant maintains that to the extent the Re-

tirement Board and Retirement Fund purport to authorize said
in-house attorneys to represent them legally and fulfill the
actions that are the province of the Attorney General as established
by Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, that said authorization is invalid and unconstitutional.

We urge upon the Court

that the Retirement Board and Retirement Fund, and the Director
thereof, are part of State government, and that the Director is
a State officer and an agent of the Executive Branch of the State
government.

As such, he may have for staff purposes such aides

as he needs for the regular business of the agencies, but he may
not appoint his own legal counsel to conduct the

~business

of the State for the Board or the Fund in· derogation of the constitutional and common-law power of the Attorney General.
The two considerations as to the source of funds:
(a)

source of funds for payment of legal services; and

(b)

the potential for conflict in the Attorney General's
office in his being on two sides of an issue
between the Retirement Fund and other State
interests,

should not be determinative on the question of who appoints legal
counsel.

Any authority of the Retirement Board or Retirement Fund
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to obtain the meaning thereof.
35=1-32, U.CoA.

(1953)~

Within the confines of Section

as amended, it should be clear that

whatever the function of the "representative" who acts as a
special prosecutor, it should be in addition to and not instead
of the power and authority of the Attorney General by Constitution and statute.
Section 67-5-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides:
"j •• and prosecute or defend all causes to
which the state or any officer, board or commission
thereof in an official capacity as a party;
and he shall have charge as attorney of all civil
legal matters in which the state is in anywise interested.
11

To harmonize this provision setting forth the general duties
of the Attorney General with the previously quoted Industrial

Commis~

sion's authorization to appoint a special representative, the appellant urges that the only reasonable conclusion one may draw is, though
the Commission may make a designation of a representative to act as a
special prosecutor, that party must come from within the ranks of the
Attorney General's office or the County Attorney's office in which the
matter lies, and that in any event any legal matters of a civil nature
to be handled through or on behalf of the Commission, must be done under
the authority of the Attorney General's office as an overriding authority
vested in the Attorney General as the State's legal officer.
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At the present time, many of the attorneys working for
the Utah Industrial Commission are denoted as "Special Assistant
Attorneys General.
state-wide basis.

11

These attorneys perform their functions on a
It is not disputed as a fact that the Industrial

Commission pays its legal counsel, these "Special Assistant Attorneys
General," further raising a question as to whether they should be
paid directly by the Commission or through the Attorney General's
office, and that the failure to so pay may be a violation of Section
67-5-3, U.C.A. {1953), as amended, which provides:
"The attorney general may assign his legal
assistants to perform legal services for any
agency of state government. He shall bill that
agency for the legal services performed, if the
agency so billed received federal matching funds
to pay for the legal services rendered. No such interaccount billings are to be made by the attorney general if no federal matching funds are provided. As
used in this act 'agency' means any department, division, agency, commission, board, council, committee,
authority, institution, or other entity within the
state government of Utah.
11

Section 35-1-32, U.C.A. {1953), as amended, deals with the
Commission as it acts in its responsibility under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The appellant takes the position that to make meaningful

the statutes that have been enacted in that regard, this Court would have
to hold that Commission has the discretion to appoint but that appointment must be made with the concurrence and under the direct supervision
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of the Attorney General of the State.
The Industrial Commission is an administrative bodyo
Its duty is to administer the Workmen's Compensation law according to the case before it and award compensation as the law
authorizes.

Aetna Life Insurance Company

Vo

Industrial Commis-

sion, 73 U. 366, 274 P. 139.
Another section of the statutes relating to the Industrial
Commission deals with the unemployment compensation provisions covered in Sections 35-4-1 through 35-4-26, UoC.A. (1953), as amended.
Section 35-4-ll (d), U.C.A. (1953), as amended, provides:
"The commission sha 11 appoint on a nonpartisan
merit basis, fix the compensation, and prescribe the
duties and powers of such officers; accountants, attorneys, experts, and other personnel as may be necessary in the performance of its duties. The commission
shall provide for a merit system covering all such persons, classify and fix the minimum· standards for the
personnel and formulate salary schedules for the service
so classified, and the commission shall hold or provide
for holding examinations to determine the technical and
professional qualifications of applicants for positions
in the commission, and provide for annual merit ratings
of employees in the commission to ascertain whether such
employees, or any of them, are maintaining the eligibility
standards prescribed by the commission and those promulgated
by the social security board ...• 11
The Commission, under an informal designation of "personnel
merit system, 11 is authorized by the Legislature in this provision as
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it administers the Employment Security Act, to appoint and fix
the compensation and delineate the powers and duties of its
personnel.

"Personnel" includes those "as may be necessary to

the performance of its duties."

Listed among those are accoun-

tants, attorneys and experts.
It is again urged by appellant that, as one reads the
full paragraph of (d) and correlates it with the general delegation of power (Section 35-4-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended), the
only fair reading would be that the Commission, in fulfilling its
responsibility to administer the Unemployment Compensation Act,
would appoint such attorneys as may be necessary for the in-house
work which may be required in claims, informal hearings, and
formal hearings; but that any attorneys who were so appointed or
involved in any "civil legal matters in which the State is in anywise interested," would of necessity have to be appointed by the
Attorney General, and the same would be directed by the Attorney
General and compensated through the Attorney General's office unless
the Commission.were reimbursed by Federal funds.
The Industrial Commission acts in an administrative role
under administrative law as part of State government.

Aetna Life

Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 U. 366, 274 P. 139.

The

Industrial Commission has no power to exercise judicial acts or
functions.
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Logan City v. Industrial Commission, 85 U. 131, 38 P.2d 769.
The director of the Utah Industrial Commission is
a State officer, functioning to administer the Workmen's Compensation law, the State Insurance Fund, Unemployment Compensation; immigration, labor, and statistics; hospital and medical service for disabled minors, and the Occupational Safety
and Health Act.
Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution, does not
state that the Attorney General may be the legal adviser for
State officers--rather it specifically states that he shall be
the "legal adviser" of the State officers.

Therefore, in the

face of this mandatory provision, appe 11 ant urges the Court to
hold Section 35-1-32 and Section 35-4-11 (d), U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, unconstitutional to the extent that they purport to be
a discretionary authorization for the Industrial Commission to
appoint its own attorneys to conduct all State legal business on
behalf of the Commission, in opposition to the grant of authority,
by Constitution and common law, of the Attorney General to so appoint.
C.

STATE INSURANCE FUND

The Legislature, in the grant of authority to the Fund
in Section 35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, states:
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In the conduct and administration of the
business of said fund the commission of finance
may appoint with the approval of the governor, a
manager, and may employ accountants, inspectors,
attorneys, physicians, investigators, clerks, stenographers, and such other experts and assistants
as it deems advisable."
11

Respondent, the State Insurance Fund, is an entity that
is equated to an insurance company, authorized by the Utah State
Legislature to collect premiums from employers to provide insurance coverage for injuries and diseases of employees who are workrelated and are covered by the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act,
Sections 35-1-1, et seg., U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
administered by the Commissioner of Finance.

The Fund is

Appellant, on this

point, has set forth his position extensively in Argument II .. The
Commissioner of Finance is a State officer.

The Director of the

Insurance Fund is a State officer and his agent.

Premiums paid by

employers to the Fund constitute the source for payment of administration and benefits under the Fund.

Employers voluntarily contri-

bute their premiums in selecting the Fund as their insurance carrier.
The Fund is only one in a competitive market of insurance funds.
The authority to employ attorneys is one of many of the
staff positions for the Commission.
In the course of the business of administering the Fund,
the Director of Finance has hired private counsel to represent the
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Fund in hearings, administrative review procedures, in matters
before the Supreme Court, and in disputed claims before the
Industrial Commission involving

defen~es

of the Fund that relate

to the Commission's administration of what is called the "second
injury fund."

Sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-69, U.C.A. (1953), as

amended.
In this Brief, as set forth in Argument II, we specifically use the State Insurance Fund as the illustration of the improper inroad by all respondents, through the Legislature, to limit
the Attorney General's constitutional powers.

Appellant incorporates

Argument II herein as standing for the proposition that Section
35-3-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, is an improper legislative encroachment on the powers and duties of the Attorney General by this provision of the statute concerning the appointive power of the State Insurance Fund, unless the Court holds that said "appointive" power of
the Commissioner of Finance is under the power of the Attorney General.
In Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of the Utah State Legislature, supra, this Court pointed out that there was a danger in allowing the Legislature to create its own legal adviser and that may
well lead to an attempt by other State officers to appoint their own
legal counsel, which could be in contravention of the
grant of power to the Attorney General.

c~nstitutional

This Court's deliberate use in
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the Hansen case, 19 U.2d at page 233, of the open-ended phrase
"and everyone else," refers to those other than the elected
State officers and is sufficiently broad to encompass the appointed lesser officers acting for the State, including the Director of the Industrial Commission and the State Insurance Fund.
· D.

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH" FOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER

In respondent's, University of Utah, Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 43), it admits the
University of Utah and the University of Utah Medical Center are
State agencies. Therefore, paragraph two of Judge Durham s Order
1

of"June 5, 19759 (R. 70), is in error, as it grants no cause of action against appellant and in favor of the respondents.

That Order

should be reversed, in part, to conform to the evidence before the
Court.
E.

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH FOR THE UNIVERSITY MEDICAL
CENTER; UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER TRUST FUND;
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, TRUSTEE

The University of Utah, on behalf of the Medical Center, made
an agreement with First Security Bank of Utah, Trustee, to have the
Trustee administer a trust for the purpose of allowing the Medical Center to self-insure against malpractice and other casualty claims.

To

the extent that the Medical Center provides educational services to the

.

University of Utah, it is funded by the State of Utah.

The Medical Cen-

ter is also funded from receipts received for patient care, including
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Federal funds (Medicaid).

(R. 43) Other than as the Trust re-

lates to the Medical Center, as its self-insuring vehicle, and as
the Medical Center relates to the University of Utah, and the University of Utah receives benefit from the Medical Center as a teaching entity of this State educational institution, there are no State
funds place in the Trust.

The Trust document (R. 60)

authorizes

the bank, as Trustee (with the approval of Hospital), to employ and
pay for, from the Trust Fund, attorneys and others as "may be necessary and proper to the effective administration of the self-insurance program, consistent with applicable regulations, guidelines and
directives of cognizant Federal agencies and pay from the Trust Fund
all costs, expenses or other liabilities that may be incurred by the
Trustee in connection therewith, except for liabilities proven to have
been caused by any wilful misconduct of the Trusteeo

11

(R. 60)

Respondent alleges that when the lawsuit was filed, there
may have been aquestion as to whether the trustee of a fund, designed
to protect the University Hospital, could retain outside counsel, separate and apart from the Attorney General •s office, but that any such question was resolved with the passage of Senate Bill 172 in the 1979 Legislative Session.

(Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, effective

May 8, 1979, is a portion of the Governmental Immunity Act, which portion
authorized the purchase of self-insurnace by governmental entities and
established trust accounts for self-insurance.) Section 63-30-28)
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(1953), as amended, reads, in part:
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the
trust agreement between the governmental entity and the
trustee may authorize the trustee to employ counsel
to defend actions against the entity and its employees
and to protect and safeguard the assets of the trust,
to provide for claims investigation and adjustment
services, to employ expert witnesses and consultants, and
to provide such other services and functions necessary and
proper to carry out the purposes of the trust. 11
11

•••

Respondent alleges that the amendment authorizes the Trustee
to retain counsel in its sole discretion, and that this authorization
supercedes Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended.
Appellant urges that Section 63-30-28, U.C.A. (1953), as
amended, insofar as it is in opposition to Art. VII, Section 18 of the
Utah Constitution, and Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, are
unconstitutional. Appellant differs with respondent as to the legal interpretation and conclusions reached in Hansen v. Legal Services Committee, supra.

Based on the lengthy argument in Argument II relative

to the State Insurance Fund, and Argument III, subparagraph (D) herein,
appellant maintains that, but for the contractual relationship between
the Trust and the University of Utah and University of Utah Medical Center, which are clearly State agencies or entities, the Trust would not
exist.

Further, it is not the source of funds of the Trust that should

determine the authority to appoint legal counse.
it is the nature of the business to be done.

As stated in Argument II,

In interpreting this recent

amendment and giving meaning thereto, we must either resolve the conflict
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between the Trust authority to appoint and the constitutional
and common-law authority of the Attorney General to appoint legal
counsel, or we must reject Senate Bill 172 as an unconstitutional
inroad on the power of the Attorney General.
F.

THE COURT SHOULD NARROWLY CONSTRUE THE ABOVE
STATUTES SO AS TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY MANDATES TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL DISCUSSED UNDER ARGUMENTS I AND II.

G.

THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THE STATUTES EMPO~JERING THE
RESPONDENTS TO APPOINT LEGAL COUNSEL UNCONSTITUTIONAL IF THEY CANNOT BE SO CONSTRUED.
CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse, in part, the Order of Judge Durham,
June 5, 1979, as the University of Utah and the University Medical Center are admittedly State agencies and are represented by the Attorney
General.
The heart of the matter in the instant case is whether the Attorney General possesses the right to appoint independent legal counsel
for all State officers with the exception of State legislators. The Utah
Supreme Court in Hansen v. Legal Services Committee of Utah State Legislature, supra, firmly renounced the Legislature s attempt to diminish the
1

duties or emasculate the powers conferred upon the Attorney General by the
Utah Constitution.

In light of the precedent established in Hansen, any

State officer who desires to obtain power to appoint his own independent
legal counsel, regardless of the sources or nature of funds used for
compensation, must follow the same procedure later pursued by the Utah
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State Legislature: constitutional amendment.
As was argued by the Attorney General before the Utah
Supreme Court in Hansen, supra, Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah
Constitution, contains two parts:

The first makes the Attorney

General "the legal adviser for 'State Officers.

111

The second empowers

the Legislature to legislate on matters concerning the duties of the
Attorney General other than as legal adviser for "State Officers."
The Legislature may impose what authorized obligations it will on the
Attorney General, but it may not replace him with someone else to perform his constitutional obligation to act as legal adviser to State officers.
Illustrative of the claims of respondents who are quasi-State
agencies and State funds, see Argument II.
The Attorney General also has common-law powers that define
his responsibilities to "perform such other duties as may be provided by
law.

11

(Art. VII, Section 18 of the Utah Constitution.)
The scope and nature of the state-wide governmental powers ex-

ercised by the Directors of these agencies and quasi-agency funds.qualify
them in their own right to be considered as "State Officers," but they
are also agents of the Governor (the Director of Finance being a primary
agent) for whom the Attorney General serves as the uncontested legal adviser.

It is urged that the Director of Finance and other respondents,

as agents of the Governor, should not be able to hire independent legal
counsel--even though authorized to do so pursuant to statute, since the
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Governor as principal could not do the same.

Thus, we submit that the

listed statutes of Argument II are an improper legislative authorization in contravention of the constitutional mandate of the Attorney
General.
Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
lower court in all judgments finding for appellant against all respondents as follows:
1.

That appellant is the sole legal counsel for said re-

spondents and all State

agencies~to

the exclusion of any independent

counsel, and that statutes which conflict with Art. VII, Section 18
of the Utah Constitution, and Section 67-5-3, U.C.A. (1953), as amended,
and Section 67-5-5, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, are declared invalid
and unconstitutional insofar as they grant authority to any State agency,,
political subdivision, or State Fund to hire its own independent legal counsel.
2.

That all respondents may not pay independent legal counsel

out of its funds for legal services performed; and granting appellant
permanent injunction against said respondents from paying for legal services
and hiring independent legal

co~u~s~~.~7;J
J.u. 11(/,f··.u).~fi~·i
ed!}
Jl///4W;; . !/).
RNARD M. TANNER

Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM G. GIBBS
Assistant Attorney General
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